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THE CONFLATION OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY AND
OBVIOUSNESS: ALICE’S SUBSTITUTION OF
SECTION 103
Paxton M. Lewis*
INTRODUCTION
Patent protection has been a priority since the United States’ founding fathers
granted Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 With its power, Congress has created
limitations on what is patentable through section 101 of the Patent Act.2 Courts
have continuously emphasized the broad understanding “of what constitutes
patentable subject matter under section 101,” referencing a House note that
“‘anything under the sun that is made by man’ is eligible for the patent
monopoly.”3 However, the conditions for patent eligible subject matter have
significantly narrowed, particularly since the introduction of abstract ideas in
1978.4 And although the Supreme Court has addressed numerous patents involving
matters of patent eligibility,5 the Court has refused to define or clarify what falls
under the patent ineligible category of abstract ideas.6
In Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International, the Supreme Court adopted a
*

J.D. Candidate, May 2017, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; B.S.,
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1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
Section 101 of the Patent Act analyzes whether the invention is patent eligible. The
statute states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012).
3
Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s Fantastic
Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 5
(2015) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1304 (2012)).
4
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is a
commonplace that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable subject matter.”).
5
See e.g., id. at 585–96 (majority opinion) (addressing whether a mathematical formula for
computing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process was an abstract idea); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010) (addressing whether a method for hedging was an
abstract idea).
6
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (“In any event, we need not
labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”).
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framework for determining whether section 101 is met for patents claiming
abstract ideas,7 setting a higher standard for patent eligibility and “invalidating
numerous patents in district courts.”8 To satisfy Alice, “the [patentee’s] invention
must ‘supply a “‘new and useful”’ application of the [abstract] idea.’”9 Since the
Alice decision, hundreds of patents have been invalidated for failure to add an
inventive concept that sufficiently transforms the abstract idea into a patent eligible
application.10 The courts fail to provide a consistent analysis, if any at all, of the
two-step framework provided in Alice.11
The Alice framework confuses the lower courts because judges must decide if
an invention is “an abstract idea or an inventive concept of an abstract idea.”12 But
the Supreme Court even admits that “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions. . . embody,
use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.’”13 Without, at a minimum, a clear understanding of what claims fall under
an abstract idea, it is not reasonable to expect the lower courts to conclude what
additional elements are enough to constitute an inventive concept of an abstract
idea. Further, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on an inventive concept is misplaced
under section 101. Step two of the Alice framework engages the court to determine
if the other elements of the claims are “well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies].”14 However, this analysis already takes place under section 10315 for
obviousness, which “exists to prevent the patent monopoly from being granted on
well-understood, routine, or conventional activity.”16
Numerous issues arise with the Supreme Court’s conflation of patent
eligibility and obviousness. First, it is unclear why step one is necessary if all
7

Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296–97).
Ameritox, Ltd. V. Millennium Health, LLC, 88 F. Supp. 3d 885, 903 (W.D. Wis. 2015).
9
Id. at 908 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357).
10
See, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(invalidating Patent No. 7,644,019); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 56 F.
Supp. 3d 813, 820–25 (E.D. Va. 2014) (invalidating Patent Nos. 7,631,065, 7,412,510,
6,836,797, and 6,947,984); Comcast IP Holdings I, LLC v. Spring Commc’ns Co. L.P., 55
F. Supp. 3d 544, 550 (D. Del. 2014) (invalidating Patent. No. 6,873,694), appeal filed.
11
See e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Mfrs. and Traders Trust Co., 76 F. Supp. 3d 536,
548 (D. Del. 2014) (providing a detailed outline of the two-step inquiry and concluding the
patents were valid without an analysis).
12
Vyas, supra note 3, at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
13
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (omission in original)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012)).
14
Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (alteration in original).
15
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.”).
16
Vyas, supra note 3, at 22.
8
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inventions embody patent ineligible matter at some level.17 Second, the Court’s use
of “inventive concept” is confusingly similar to the analysis for obviousness. Even
if the Court intended a different meaning, the lower courts’ interpretations are
inconsistent and routinely apply a consolidated analysis for issues of patent
eligibility and obviousness.18 Third, if the issues of obviousness and patent
eligibility merge, it is unclear how the patent should be evaluated. For example, the
components of a claim may not be assessed individually under section 103. But the
claims are analyzed individually and as a whole when determining if the additional
elements of a patent transform the abstract idea into patent eligible matter under
section 101.19
This Note begins with a brief review of the statutes in patent law that come
under issue in Alice. It then delves into the history of patent ineligibility and
abstract ideas. Next, the Article goes into detail about Alice, and then discusses the
aftermath of the case in the lower courts. This Article walks through the related
issues, mentioned in the paragraph above, that arise from the two-step analysis for
patent eligibility of an abstract idea. It proposes two alternatives to resolve the
current issues: (1) eliminate step one and change the language of step two to
properly explain the Court’s concern of preemption rather than obviousness; or (2)
accept the consolidation of the analyses for patent eligibility and obviousness, but
clarify the guidelines to prevent Alice from becoming an unmerciful patent killer.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Patent Act

The Constitution grants Congress the power to grant patents and to create
limitations on what is patentable.20 The Progress Clause is intended to serve two
functions. It “encourag[es] inventors to engage in research and innovation,” and it
“reward[s] the public by having more fruit strung to the tree of human knowledge
that is sufficiently ripe for consumption and progress.”21 In other words, the
Progress Clause’s purpose is to create incentive for inventors to continue inventing
in exchange for limited exclusive rights to the idea while also promoting
industrialism and allowing other inventors to build on previous ideas.
Although Congress has enacted numerous statutes relevant to granting

17

See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
See e.g., I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 Fed. Appx. 982, 986, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(The majority opinion is an analysis of obviousness and the concurring opinion is an
analysis of patent eligibility, but the analyses are very similar and come to the same
conclusion.); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
19
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
20
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
21
Vyas, supra note 3, at *4.
18
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patents,22 the two significant statutes relating to Alice are section 101 and section
103 of the Patent Act because Alice conflates the two separate requirements into
one analysis. Section 101 governs patentable inventions.23 The statute states:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”24
Although the language of section 101 is quite expansive, there are “three judicially
created exceptions.”25 Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are
ineligible patent subject matter.26
Section 103 governs one of the conditions for patentability. That is, the
invention must claim non-obvious subject matter.27 Specifically, the statute states:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.28
The framework for analyzing Section 103 has been laid out since the 1800’s.29
Under an obviousness analysis, the court looks at: “the scope and content of the
prior art . . . differences between the prior art and the claims at issue . . . the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art . . . [and] secondary considerations [such] as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.”30

B. Development of Abstract Ideas
1. Patent Eligibility in Early Dicta
The issue of abstractness was discussed as early as 1852 when the
Supreme Court heard Le Roy v. Tatham.31 Famous for a singular statement cited in
almost every case on patent eligibility, the Court briefly mentioned: “A principle,
in the abstract is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”32 Mistakenly,
22

See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 103, 112.
35 U.S.C. § 101.
24
Id.
25
Mark Patrick, The Federal Circuit and Ultramercial: Software and Business Method
Patents Tumble Further Down the Rabbit Hole, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2015).
26
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
27
35 U.S.C. § 103.
28
Id. (emphasis added).
29
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (1851).
30
KSR Intern Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
31
14 How. 156, 175 (1852).
32
Id.
23
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Le Roy’s famous quote is often viewed as the holding of the case,33 but it is simply
dicta in a case where the Court chose to ignore the patent eligibility issue and focus
on novelty, a separate patentability issue.34
A year after Le Roy was decided, the Court decided O’Reilly v. Morse35,
which scholars and courts have incorrectly viewed as focusing on patentability of
abstract ideas.36 Although the Court addresses the validity of the claims, it was not
under eligibility of abstract ideas.37 The patentee in O’Reilly was attempting to
claim all modes and processes, even those not described by him in any manner, for
motive power.38 This is not a conversation on laws of nature or abstract ideas.
Instead, it is simply a conversation on preemption: when is a claim too broad?39
In a blog post, Robert Sachs, a patent attorney with a concentration in
software technologies,40 keeps a running tally, shown in the table below, of the
historical cases addressed above and whether they support the current section 101
propositions.41
§ 101 Proposition
Yes
No
A newly discovered law of nature, or abstract idea, when
0
2
simply “applied,” is not patent eligible.
A court should always determine patent eligibility as gateway
0
2
question.
A court can determine patent eligibility based on a “plain
0
2
English” gist, without claim construction.
Preemption of “basic tools” of science, commerce, and
0
1
communication means that a claim is not patent eligible.
This table clarifies that LeRoy and O’Reilly do not compare with the current
33

See e.g., John Clizer, Exploring the Abstract: Patent Eligibility Post Alice Corp v. CLS
Bank, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), 80 MO. L.
REV. 537, 542 (2015) (referencing the famous statement as the Court’s holding).
34
Le Roy, 14 How. at 177; see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355
(2014) (quoting the famous dicta from Le Roy).
35
56 How. 62 (1853).
36
See e.g., Clizer, supra note 33, at 542 (“[T]he court decided the case of O’Reilly v.
Morse, which discussed in detail the problems associated with patenting abstract ideas.”).
37
O’Reilly, 56 How. at 113.
38
Id. at 120 (“Now, in this case, there is no description but one, of a process by which
signs or letters may be printed at a distance. And yet he claims the exclusive right to any
other mode and any other process, although not described by him . . . .”).
39
Id. at 113.
40
ROBERT R. SACHS, FENWICK & WEST LLP,
http://www.fenwick.com/professionals/Pages/bobsachs.aspx (last visited October 17,
2016).
41
Robert R. Sachs, Patent Eligibility: The Historical Cases, BILSKIBLOG (May 23, 2013),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2013/05/the-historical-cases.html.
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focus of patent eligibility. As Sachs points out, the cases “support a more
restrained and limited approach to patent eligibility, one that does not imbue the
analysis with a normative overlay of what ‘ought’ to be patentable . . . but instead
relies on more discrete and focused analysis of what is claimed.”42

2. The Abstract Idea Exception Under Section 101: Case Law
The first mention of “abstract ideas” is in the dissent of Parker v. Flook.43
Justice Stewart references Le Roy and O’Reilly when he states: “A patent could not
issue . . . on the law of gravity, or the multiplication tables, or the phenomena of
magnetism, or the fact that water at sea level boils at 100 degrees centigrade and
freezes at zero—even though newly discovered.”44 “Notably, this reference by the
dissent . . . seems to equate the term with physical or natural laws,” rather than
giving any examples of abstract ideas.45
The patent in Flook was directed at “a method of updating alarm limits.”46
The three-step process for updating alarm limits had existed before the patent.47
But the patent changed the second conventional step of the known process by
adding a mathematical formula.48 However, “[t]he patent application does not
purport to explain how to select the appropriate margin of safety, the weighing
factor, or any other variables.”49 Thus, “[t]he question in this case is whether the
identification of a limited category of useful, though conventional, post-solution
applications of such a formula makes respondent’s method eligible for patent
protection.”50 And the answer is no because the practices are well known.51 The
Court understands mathematical formulas to be “one of the ‘basic tools of
scientific and technological work.’”52 Whether it is known or unknown, the
formula “is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”53 Thus, the
method does not fall under patent eligible subject matter.
Interestingly enough, the Court’s rationale of the patentee’s invention
being well known and a part of the prior art did not lead the Court to analyze the
patent under section 103. Rather, Flook initiates the amalgam of obviousness
language with the analysis of patent eligibility. Although the respondent argued
42

Id.
437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is a commonplace that laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.”).
44
Id. at 598–99.
45
Vyas, supra note 3, at 9.
46
437 U.S. at 585.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 586.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 585.
51
Id. at 594.
52
Id. at 591 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
53
Id. at 592.
43
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similarly to this observation, the Court ignored him.54 The Court correctly
rationalized that “[t]he obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to
be patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact,
new or obvious.”55 But, as shown in the preceding paragraph, the Court’s language
suggests an obviousness analysis within its analysis of patent eligibility by
merging the discussion of what is a patentable invention with the dicta that “an
inventive application of the principle may be patented.”56 The dissent seems to
agree with this issue, clarifying: “Section 101 is concerned only with subjectmatter patentability. Whether a patent will actually issue depends upon the criteria
of §§ 102 and 103.”57 Justice Stewart claimed that the majority’s analysis is a
“damaging blow [to the] basic principles of patent law by importing its inquiry
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness.”58
As the dissent’s opinion shows, Flook is the beginning of the struggle to
maintain separation between obviousness and patent eligibility. Justice Stewart
also touches on the second issue that arises through Alice: Whether a claim can be
dissected into its components when analyzing patent eligibility with obviousness
language.59 The issue of patent eligibility arose in Flook because “one step in the
process would not be patentable subject matter if considered in isolation.”60
However, the dissent points out that “thousands of processes and combinations
have been patented that contained one or more steps that themselves would have
been unpatentable subject matter.”61 It is acceptable to invalidate a patent for
containing no new inventive feature as a whole, as the majority concluded here.62
However, the Court cannot dissect the patent into its components and use an
obviousness analysis on only one of those components as the Court implies.63
The Court briefly leads away from this issue in Diamond v. Diehr.64 In this
case, the Court was “determin[ing] whether a process for curing synthetic rubber
which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a
programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter.”65 The Court concluded
that the claims were “drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber
products” and were not “attempt[ing] to patent a mathematical formula.”66 The
54

Id. (“Respondent argues that this approach improperly imports into § 101 the
considerations of ‘inventiveness’ which are the proper concerns of §§ 102 and 103.”).
55
Id. at 593.
56
Id. at 594.
57
Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 599.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 599–600.
62
Id. at 594 (majority opinion).
63
Id. at 594 (the “inventive application”).
64
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
65
Id. at 177.
66
Id. at 192–93.
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Court came to this conclusion by considering the patentability of the process as a
whole.67
Shown in the lower courts’ struggle to distinguish between Flook and Diehr,68
the Court does not clarify why Flook is patent ineligible while Diehr maintained
eligibility. Both cases involved patents with steps of a process, where one or more
steps involved a mathematical formula and the rest of the process was already
known. The only difference seen is that Diehr clarifies that “only the question of
whether respondents’ claims fall within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter” was before the Court,69 while the dissent in Flook points out that
the majority failed to separate patent eligibility and obviousness in its analysis.70
Abstract ideas were not again addressed by the Supreme Court until 2010,
almost thirty years later. In Bilski v. Kappos,71 the claims at issue “were directed to
a process of hedging risk in commodities trading by investing in other segments of
the energy industry.”72 The Court invalidated the claims because they were
directed to an unpatentable abstract idea.73 There are two “clarifications” drawn
from Bilski. First, the underlying concern of patenting abstract ideas is
preemption.74 Second, the “machine-or-transformation test” is not an “exhaustive
test” for patentable abstract ideas, but it “is a useful and important clue, an
investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes
under § 101.”75
But these clarifications also leave the lower courts with more questions. First,
although the justices unanimously agreed that the claims constituted an abstract
idea, there is still no definitional or categorical understanding for what constitutes
an abstract idea.76 The Court simply states that “it is clear that petitioners’
application is not a patentable ‘process.’”77 The Court mentions that “[h]edging is a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and
67

Id. at 192.
See e.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (holding that the transformation of data constitutes a patent eligible invention
because it produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile looking for ‘a useful, concrete, and tangible result’
may in many instances provide useful indications of whether a claim is drawn to a
fundamental practical application of such a principle, that inquiry is insufficient to
determine whether a claim is patent-eligible under § 101.”).
69
450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981).
70
42 U.S. 584, 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
72
Patrick, supra note 25, at 1096.
73
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612–13.
74
Id. at 611–12 (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”).
75
Id. at 604.
76
Id. at 611.
77
Id.
68
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taught in introductory finance class” and “[a]llowing petitions to patent risk
hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields . . . effectively grant[ing]
a monopoly over an abstract idea.”78 In other words, the Court does not clarify
what an abstract idea is, but only states that it is not something humans have been
doing for a long period of time and it is not something that preempts use of the
idea in all fields. Second, although the “machine-or-transformation test” is an
important tool for analyzing processes under Section 101, the Court does not
develop a clear test for patents claiming abstract ideas.
Although Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.79
involves laws of nature, the test developed from the case is adopted for
patentability of abstract ideas under Alice.80 In Mayo, the patent is directed at
methods “that help doctors who use thiopurine drugs to treat patients with
autoimmune diseases determine whether a given dosage level is too low or too
high.”81 The test developed by the Supreme Court to determine eligibility of this
patent consists of two steps. First, the Court determines if the patent at issue is
directed at a law of nature.82 If the answer is yes, the Court moves on to step two
and asks: “[D]o the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations
to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that
apply natural laws?”83 If the answer is no, then the patent claims are directed to
patent ineligible subject matter and the claims are invalidated.
The Court unanimously concludes that the patent at issue in Mayo claimed a
law of nature and was unpatentable because “the steps in the claimed processes
(apart from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine,
conventional activity” and “upholding the patents would risk disproportionately
tying up the use of underlying natural laws.”84 Essentially, the Court reasons that
step two is not met because the claims are obvious and would preempt other
inventions using the law of nature. The concern of preemption of unpatentable
subject matter is reasonable.85 However, a search for obviousness in the analysis of
the additional elements to the law of nature is not.86 By looking at the steps
individually and assessing whether the steps are conventional or obvious, Mayo
improperly shifts a section 103 analysis, which requires claims to be looked at as a
78

Id. at 611–12 (internal quotations & citations omitted).
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
80
Id. at 1297.
81
Id. at 1294.
82
Id. at 1296–97.
83
Id. at 1297.
84
Id. at 1294.
85
Id. at 1297 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law
of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that
the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”).
86
Id. at 1298 (internal quotations omitted) (“Purely conventional or obvious[pre]-solution
activity is normally not sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patenteligible application of such a law.”).
79
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whole, into the section 101 analysis.87 Mayo relies on the same rationale as Flook,
which, as discussed previously, is misguided.88 “Returning to the analysis in Flook
only muddied the waters because in order to pass the § 101 patent-eligibility
threshold, a computer-implemented invention must now contain an ‘inventive
concept’ beyond the mere application of a mathematical . . . formula and beyond
concepts already in practice by those in the field.”89
The Federal Circuit has cautioned against using the “‘inventive concept’
language found in Mayo” because it “will conflate §101 with the other conditions
of patentability.”90 And in a concurring opinion after Mayo, Judge Lourie advised
that the correct test would focus on preemption.91 However, the Supreme Court did
not heed Judge Lourie’s warnings or the conflicting understandings of the patent
eligibility analysis in the lower courts. Instead, the Supreme Court adopted the
framework in Mayo in order to determine the patentability of abstract ideas.92

II. ALICE AND HER AFTERMATH
A. The Alice Decision
Alice v. CLS Bank reached the Supreme Court in 2014 after the Federal
Circuit could not reach a majority opinion.93 “Including former Chief Judge
Rader’s additional reflections, the court released seven different opinions,”
illustrating just how convoluted the analysis can be for patent eligibility.94
The patents at issue in Alice “disclose a computer-implemented scheme for
mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., risk that only one party to a financial transaction
will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary.”95 In determining
whether the claims were patent eligible under Section 101, the Supreme Court
adopted the two-step test in Mayo regarding laws of nature.96 The first step
87

35 U.S.C. § 103.
Patrick, supra note 25, at 1101.
89
Id. at 1102.
90
Id. at 1104.
91
Ultramerical, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e must
determine whether the claim poses ‘any risk of preempting an abstract idea.’ To do so we
must first ‘identify and define whatever fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the
claim . . .’ Then proceeding with the preemption analysis, the balance of the claim is
evaluated to determine whether ‘additional substantive limitations . . . narrow, confine, or
otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical terms, it does not cover the full abstract
idea itself.”).
92
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
93
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (listing the
opinions).
94
Patrick, supra note 25, at 1105.
95
134 S. Ct. at 2351–52.
96
Id. at 2350.
88
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requires the Court to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to” an
abstract idea.97 The Court concludes that the patents at issue are directed to patent
ineligible subject matter: that is, the “claims are drawn to the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement.”98 But, the Court adds very little clarification as to how it
reached its conclusion. There are three statements the Court makes that add some
“clarity:” First, the Court insists that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept
of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in
our system of commerce.’”99 Second, the Court explains that an abstract idea can
be “a method of organizing human activity.”100 And third, the Court tells us what
an abstract idea is not. In other words, the abstract idea category includes more
than just “preexisting, fundamental truth[s].”101 Beyond these three vague
statements, the Court explicitly refuses to define an abstract idea, simply stating:
“we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category
in this case.”102
The second step asks the court to “examine the elements of the claim to
determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible application.”103 A claim that is directed
to an abstract idea must have “additional features” to prevent the monopolization
of a patent ineligible subject matter.104 The Court makes a few specific points
about the second step of the Alice framework. First, the claim must do more than
instruct one “to apply the applicable laws.”105 Also, “computer implementation
[does] not supply the necessary inventive concept.”106 And finally, merging the
two to say “apply it with a computer” has “the same deficient result.”107 The Court
concludes that “the claims here do [nothing] more than simply instruct the
practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic
computer.”108 In its analysis, the Court notes that it analyzes “the claim elements
separately”109 and “as a whole.”110 Because the Court answered no to step two, the
Court held there was “not ‘enough’ to transform an abstract idea into a patenteligible invention,” and the Court invalidated the patents at issue in Alice.111
97
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1. A Few Interesting Observations
Before diving into the analysis, Justice Thomas quoted the numerous cases
that have come before the Court on patent eligibility.112 An important theme
arising from these paragraphs is preemption.113 However, beyond raising this
theme in his policy considerations, there is very little analysis of the patents at
issue for preemption concerns. Rather, the Court simply avoids defining abstract
idea in step one and focuses on the inventive concept language in step two.114
When Justice Thomas clarified that an abstract idea is not limited to
“preexisting, fundamental truths that exist in principle apart from any human
action,” he gave no reason why.115 Instead, he simply explained that Bilski was not
about a “preexisting, fundamental truth,” so the claims in the patents at issue in
Alice did not need to involve preexisting, fundamental truths either.116 This
analysis is quite lacking. Although precedent is a great starting point, the Court’s
rejection of the patentee’s argument is incomplete.
Lastly, the Court’s analysis of the abstract idea includes a list of references to
exemplify that the abstract idea of intermediated settlement “was long standard in
the industry.”117 The court references a comparable precedent118 and a couple
articles119 to conclude that intermediated settlement falls under an unpatentable
abstract idea because it has been around for a long enough time period. However,
these references are equivalent to prior art references, which are intended to be
analyzed under Section 103 for obviousness.120
These three observations illustrate that the opinion in Alice left large gaps in
the analysis for patentability of abstract ideas. This is concerning because it does
not leave the lower courts with the proper guidance needed for Section 101
112
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inquiries. Additionally, the prior art references mentioned in the analysis for step
one of Alice will create confusion, particularly because the Court refused to define
an abstract idea. Because prior art references are made in step one and the
inventive concept language used in step two indicates an obviousness analysis, it is
unclear how to separate Section 101 and Section 103 under Alice, as demonstrated
in the lower courts after Alice was decided.121

B. The Aftermath of Alice
Since the Court’s decision in Alice, hundreds of patents have been invalidated
for failure to claim sufficiently more than an unpatentable abstract idea.122
Unfortunately, the majority of the cases decided in the lower courts are not clearly
analogous to Bilski, as the patents in Alice were.123 Without guidance on how to
determine what is an abstract idea, it is unclear how the courts will also be able to
determine what elements could be more than an abstract idea. And this issue is
illustrated in the inconsistencies of cases throughout the lower courts. There are
cases where minimal analysis exists for evaluating the patent under Alice.124 There
are cases that skip step one of the Alice framework.125 There are cases where the
Alice framework has been ignored.126 And there are cases where the majority
opinion relies on Section 103 for obviousness while the concurring opinion relies
121
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on Section 101 for patent eligibility.127 In other words, very little clarity, if any at
all, has risen from Alice in determining what is patentable. This section examines
post-Alice cases that demonstrate some of the issues listed above.

1. Skipping Step One of Alice
“[T]he Federal Circuit found itself divisively split [again] regarding abstract
idea jurisprudence” in DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com.128 The patent at issue was
directed to “systems and methods of generating a composite web page that
combines certain visual elements of a ‘host’ website with content of a third-party
merchant.”129 The patent’s asserted claims did not fall under the few categories that
the Supreme Court has confirmed are abstract ideas, including mathematical
algorithms and fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practices.130
The Court recognized the difficulty in identifying the abstract idea.131 And rather
than classifying the abstract idea, “the Court maintained that however the abstract
idea was defined, step two of the Alice framework . . . would be satisfied, no
matter what the abstract idea was.”132
The Federal Circuit essentially eliminated step one of the Alice framework
because it was clear that there was an inventive concept regardless of how the
abstract idea was defined. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has admitted
that at some level, all inventions embody patent ineligible subject matter.133 This
concept leads to the inquiry of whether step one is necessary, as discussed below,
if the courts are able to conclude on step two without analyzing step one.
Although the Federal Circuit majority concluded there was an inventive
concept without reaching any clarity on the abstract idea, the dissent insisted that
the patent claims were directed to an abstract idea– “that an online merchant’s
sales can be increased if two web pages have the same ‘look and feel.’”134 The
dissent concluded that the patent did nothing more than instruct the user to “apply
that concept using a generic computer.”135
As illustrated from this case, there are concerns with how to apply both steps
127
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of the test for patentability of abstract ideas. Where the majority saw so clearly that
there was an inventive concept, it is surprising to see such a bright-line split
between the majority and dissenting opinions.

2. Use of Section 103 or Section 101?
In I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., the Federal Circuit invalidated the asserted
claims of Patent Nos. 6,314,420 and 6,775,664 for obviousness.136 Although Judge
Mayer agreed with the invalidation of the patents, he rested his analysis on patent
ineligibility.137 Judge Mayer concluded that there was no disclosure of new
technology, and the claims “simply recite the use of a generic computer to
implement a well-known and widely-practiced technique for organizing
information.”138
The claims “relate to a method for filtering Internet search results that
utilizes both content-based and collaborative filtering.”139 “Google Defendants
argue that I/P Engine’s claimed invention is obvious as a matter of law because it
simply combines content-based and collaborative filtering, two information
filtering methods that were well-known in the art.”140 Google did not make an
argument under Section 101. The Court held that the patent was invalidated for
obviousness because “[t]he record is replete. . . with prior art references
recognizing that content-based and collaborative filtering are complimentary
techniques that can be effective combined.”141
Judge Mayer disagreed with an obviousness approach because “fail[ure] to
address at the very outset whether claims meet the strictures of section 101 is to
put the cart before the horse.”142 He insisted that a Section 101 analysis is
necessary before addressing “subordinate validity issues such as non-obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.”143 Although patent eligibility may be at issue in this case,
neither party claimed the issue, and the patents at issue were already invalidated
under Section 103.
This case illustrates that it is still unclear whether a Section 101 or Section
103 analysis should be applied. It is particularly difficult to separate the opinions
because Judge Mayer still analyzes the inventive concept under the obviousness
analysis. He even cites Judge Wallach’s opinion on obviousness in his analysis for
lack of inventive concept, stating that “the use of search engines was wellestablished and the clear advantages of combining content-based and collaborative
136
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filtering were widely recognized at the time of the claimed invention.”144 Even if
Section 101 should be analyzed before Section 103 at all times, referencing an
obviousness analysis within Judge Mayer’s Section 101 analysis confuses the
process and order for invalidity claims.

III. ISSUES ARISING FROM ALICE
Although the issues have been scattered through the discussion above, the
following section will briefly discuss the issues arising from Alice. First, it is
unclear why step one of the Alice framework, i.e., determining whether the claims
are directed to an abstract idea and identifying the abstract idea, is necessary.
Second, it is difficult to distinguish between the inventive concept language in the
test for Section 101 and the obviousness language for Section 103. And third, if the
inventive concept language is left as is, it unclear whether the language of Section
103, i.e., the claim must be analyzed as a whole, should be implemented into the
inventive concept analysis.145

A. Is Step One of Alice Necessary?
In Mayo, the Court admitted that “all inventions at some level embody,
use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.”146But the process may be patentable even though it contains an
unpatentable abstract idea, as long as there is an inventive concept that transforms
the unpatentable abstract idea into a patent-eligible application of the abstract
idea.147 If all inventions rely on a form of patent ineligible subject matter, then it
seems that step two of the Alice framework, i.e., the inventive concept, should be
the only inquiry in determining whether a patent’s claims go beyond the patent
ineligible subject matter.
Indeed, in DDR Holdings, that is exactly what the Federal Circuit did.
After acknowledging the difficulty in identifying the abstract idea, the Federal
Circuit justified that the inventive concept was so apparent that there was no need
to analyze step one.148 It seems counterintuitive to be able to analyze step two
without analyzing step one because step two requires there to be an inventive
concept of the abstract idea identified. However, if the underlying idea in every
patent is unpatentable, then an analysis of what transforms the idea beyond the
patent ineligible matter is sufficient.

B. The Inventive Concept Language

144

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 103.
146
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
147
Id. at 1294.
148
DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
145

2017

UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW

29

Although “the plurality [at the Federal Circuit level] in CLS Bank goes to
great lengths to specify that ‘inventive’ under section 101 has a markedly distinct
meaning from inventiveness under section 103,”149 this has not been illustrated in
the lower courts since Alice was decided at the Supreme Court, as discussed
earlier.150 Besides acknowledging “the quest for ‘something more,’” the Supreme
Court does not clarify what the inventive concept is.151 Rather, the Court only
clarifies what it is not. “For instance, the Court focused on the idea that
implementation of a generic computer is not enough.”152
“[D]espite the Supreme court’s insistence that the phrase ‘inventive
concept’ does not conflate a section 103 analysis into a section 101 inquiry,”153
step two of the Alice framework engages the court to determine if the other
elements of the claims are “well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies].”154
“[M]eanwhile the obviousness inquiry under section 103 exists to prevent the
patent monopoly from being granted on well-understood, routine, or conventional
activity.”155 Although the Court admits that there may be overlap between the
patent eligibility inquiry and other patent inquiries,156 there is too much overlap
here for the courts to be able to separate the patent eligibility issue and the
obviousness issue. As discussed above, the issue of conflation has been a concern
since 1978 when the dissent in Flook warned the Court of this very problem.

C. Analyzing the Claim as a Whole Versus Individually
If the Court determines that the claims at issue are directed to an abstract
idea, “the Court then asks whether the claim’s elements, considered both
individually and ‘as an ordered combination,’ ‘transform the nature of the claim’
into a patent-eligible application.”157 As discussed above, the second step of the
Alice framework conflates Section 101 for patent eligibility and Section 103 for
obviousness. This is problematic because the statutory language for Section 103
requires that the claimed invention as a whole be analyzed for obviousness against
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the prior art.158 The inventive concept language incorporates an obviousness
analysis and allows the courts to analyze the individual claims of the invention for
the inventive concept.159 By allowing a claimed invention to be dissected into its
individual components for step two of the Alice framework, the Court is allowing
Section 101 to do what is not an option under Section 103, i.e., look at the
individual claims of an invention for obviousness.

IV. RESOLVING THE ISSUES
The abstract idea category is exactly that: abstract. And because the Court
has explicitly refused to define what an abstract idea is,160 it is unlikely that the
Alice framework will provide any more clarity before unnecessarily invalidating
more computer software patents for patent ineligibility. As argued in Annal D.
Vyas’s Alice in Wonderland, the category of abstract idea could all together be
eliminated by adding the following phrase to Section 101 of the Patent Act: “The
abstractness of an idea shall not serve as a bar to its eligibility.”161 In other words,
step one of the Alice framework should be eliminated. As referenced earlier, the
Court has already admitted that all inventions embody patent ineligible subject
matter at some level.162 Rather than continuing to acknowledge that abstract ideas
are a patent ineligible category, the Court should only focus on the second step of
the Alice framework to determine if an invention is patent eligible.
The earliest cases on patent eligibility focused on the proper issue: when is
a claim too broad? The underlying foundation for the holdings in the previously
discussed patent eligibility cases is preemption.163 However, the focus on
preemption has been lost under the obviousness language since 1978 when the
dissent in Flook warned the Court of the potential conflation of Section 101 for
patent eligibility and Section 103 for obviousness.164 The Court should be
reminded of its decision in Diehr, where the Court said, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any
158
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element or steps in a process, or even the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories
of possibly patentable subject matter.”165
Although the Court may have intended a distinction between inventiveness
under Section 101 and Section 103, the lower court cases superseding Alice
illustrate that the term has caused patent eligibility and obviousness to merge into
one analysis.166 For this reason, the “inventive concept” language must transition
back to preemption.
LeRoy and O’Reilly did not focus on what should be patent eligible.
Instead, the cases looked at exactly what was being claimed, and asked whether the
claims were too broad. If the claims preempt other inventors from building on an
underlying principle, then the claims are too broad and should be invalidated.
Going back to the purpose of the Progress Clause, patents are intended to promote
industrialism and incentive inventors to continue inventing.167 Rather than
analyzing a patent’s claims for an inventive concept under Section 101, the Court
should return to the analysis in O’Reilly and save the question of inventiveness for
a later review of obviousness under Section 103. Thus, the patent eligibility
inquiry should ask and evaluate whether a claim is so broad as to preempt other
inventors from building on the underlying principle.
However, if the Alice framework upholds and the patent inquiries are
conflated, the Court must adopt a bright-line rule to prevent an improper analysis
of obviousness. The statutory language of Section 103 specifically requires one to
analyze the invention as a whole when determining whether an invention is
obvious.168 Through Alice, the Court has blurred this statutory constraint by
authorizing the lower courts to dissect a patent’s claims into its components for
patent eligibility purposes while using obviousness language in the analysis.169 The
lower courts have analyzed the claims separately to determine the conventionality
of the whole invention.170 If the conflation of patent eligibility and obviousness is
maintained in the two step Alice framework, then the claims may not be dissected
in order to determine if the additional steps are conventional.
165
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Instead, the Court should be reminded of Diehr, where it looked at the
process as a whole to determine whether the invention was patentable.171 Although
the patent inquiries may overlap at times,172 there must be boundaries to prevent
the statutory language and purposes from getting lost in the analysis. Section 103
is not intended to be dissected because there are times when, for example, it may
not be obvious to combine two different patented methods together to form a new,
patentable method. If the obviousness language stays incorporated into the patent
eligibility inquiry, then the purpose of Section 103 must also be incorporated and
the patent cannot be dissected into its components to determine whether the
additional elements are conventional. Instead, it must be analyzed as a whole to
determine whether the claims are intended to patent a particular process or the
underlying principle.173
CONCLUSION
Since the birth of the abstract ideas concept, the judiciary has struggled to
define abstract idea and analyze what is patentable under this exception to Section
101. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alice has not clarified the complexities that
have arisen from the abstract ideas category. Instead, it falls in line with the
warnings of the dissent in Flook, where Justice Stewart advises against the
majority’s use of “inventive application” because it conflates the Section 101 and
Section 103 inquiries.174 In order to avoid such conflation, the Alice framework
cannot be adopted. Step one of the framework should be eliminated because all
inventions embody patent ineligible matter at some level, and it is too difficult to
identify an abstract idea without a definitional or categorical understanding of what
an abstract idea is. Step two of the framework must be reworked to prevent the
courts from adopting an obviousness analysis under Section 101. Rather than using
the “inventive concept” language, the Court should address step two as a question
of preemption, asking whether the claims in the patent are overly broad and
prevent other inventors from building upon the underlying principle. If this
suggestion is not possible, the Court should create a bright line rule, at a minimum,
to prevent the statutory constraint on the obviousness analysis from being ignored.
That is, the courts should not be allowed to break down the claim to determine
whether it is conventional. The courts must analyze the claim as a whole to
determine if the claim adds enough to transform the underlying idea into a
patentable claim.
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